The return of foot and mouth
The test for the Government with the new foot and mouth outbreak will be whether the lessons of the last, disastrous, episode of February-April 2001 have been learnt. There were basically three.
The first, and most important, is that speed of response is at a premium. Last time, the disease was discovered late when at least 57 different sites had already become infected, and then the reaction was slow and dithering. As a result, 7 million cows, sheep, pigs and goats were slaughtered, about one in every 8 of all farm animals, 10,000 farms were stricken, 30 counties affected, and all at a final cost of some £8.5bn. In addition, the images of burning pyres on television put off the tourists as the whole countryside appeared to be shut down.
This time the Government is very conscious of the need to act quickly, and is trying rapidly to identify the strain of virus which might indicate its origin and where it may have spread. Last time the contagion had already spiralled out of control before it was detected, and from its discovery at an abattoir in Essex had already spread to Cumbria, Holland and France. This time the fear is that the disease may have been in the Guildford herd for several days (though so far there is no evidence to prove that), and may have spread from a market or illegal imports of meat (an increasing risk in a globalised economy).
The second vital requirement is that, once the strain of virus has been established, vaccination within the 10 kilometre protection zone should be carried out swiftly. Last time it was rejected because Tony Blair buckled under pressure from the National Farmers Union which feared losing its valuable beef market in Europe (under EU rules vaccinated animals cannot be sold for export). Inoculation is vastly better than mass slaughter. This time the NFU must be faced down.
The third lesson is that, following the strong criticism in the Anderson Report of 2001 that the Army was brought in far too late when the epidemic had already been rife for 4 weeks, the Army should now be involved much earlier if the disease has not been contained around the Surrey farm.
This is a critical test for Gordon Brown. There are already some hints that farmers in the infected area were not told about the original discovery on 2 August till a day later, and some only learnt about it from television. If that is true, a much more open and honest approach is going to be needed at each stage on the way ahead.