For all the press reporting, you might have thought that Bill Clinton’s visit to Pyongyang was all about securing the release of two American journalists from the clutches of the world outcast. Of course it was nothing of the kind. It was all centred on the 3-hour audience with Kim Jong-il, and the release of the two women journalists (which would have been agreed beforehand) was merely the pretext to pave the way. So the question arises: what was the real objective of the Dear Leader in laying on this charade? Clearly since North Korea-US relations have been at something of a nadir since the former in recent months exploded another atomic device, fired off ballistic missiles and peremptorily wound up the 6-party talks, he wanted to assess the prospects of a more favourable demarche from the US if he made any concessions, though well short of actually abandoning the route to nuclear powerdom. Since relations between the two countries have been characterised by repeated zig-zagging between the polarities of confrontation and accommodation – between US threats to bomb nuclear weapons facilities on the one hand and loading offers of massive aid and assistance on the other – the Dear Leader would have been setting down his price for the next co-operative phase in the cycle, whilst all the while buying time for the further development of nuclear status.

The West will not admit it, but he has been remarkably successful. Neither generous incentives nor intimidating threats have managed to bring North Korea to heel, nor will they in future. Talk which is favoured in the West of punishing the country for bad behaviour or rewarding it for an approved response may satisfy Western conceit that it is somehow in charge of a wayward pupil, but the truth is that North Korea is not susceptible of manipulation. It will decide its own destiny, and the world had better adapt to that fact. The parallel with Iran is striking.
There is an assumption, widely cultivated in the West, that nuclear creep (the gradual spread of nuclear weapons beyond the initial 5 Great Powers, now extended to 9) can be controlled by strict embargoes and the usual potpourri of threats and incentives, plus the mealy-mouthed adherence of the nuclear States to Article 6 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It is a delusion. If the nuclear States are so determined to hold on to their nuclear assets at any cost – apart from some limited reductions which still leave them with an overwhelming superiority – it is hardly surprising if the near-nuclear States see such assets in the same light (regional power status, protection against attack or intimidation) and, secretly or otherwise, continue to strive to achieve such security.
Since the spread of nuclear weapons cannot ultimately be stopped (though slowing down the process wherever feasible is obviously desirable and sensible), the geopolitical role has rather to be the easing of distrust in a more polycentric world so as to remove the tensions which could give rise to nuclear-laden hostilities in the first place. That is a very different model of international relations from tradional reliance on economic and military dominance to enforce stability, but in reality we have in the long term little choice. President Obama seems to recognise this, and maintaining that policy of openness and dialogue in the face of resistance from all quarters could be the single most important achievement of a transformational presidency.

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