The unfolding Afghan delusion

October 17th, 2009

Today’s Pakistan army onslaught on the Taliban stronghold in South Waziristan fits another piece into the overall Western strategy for dealing with the impasse in Afghanistan. It is recognised that the war cannot be won on the Afghan side of the border without simultaneous action to secure the so-called tribal bad lands on the other side, and the Pakistani government has finally been persuaded (coerced?) into launching the all-out assault from which it has previously recoiled. Another element of the strategy is much greater pressure on Karzai both to submit to a second round of elections – in the hope that he might be defeated by Abdullah, though the latter may be little better – and even if he wins, to accept much greater Western control over his administration in order to try to stamp out most of the corruption. Yet another element is of course the call for a surge in coalition forces. Obama seems likely to meet his own commander McCrystal’s demand for a further 40,000 American troops, and Brown has just announced that Britain is sending a further 500 troops. The question is: does this amount to a credible strategy, and could it succeed? The odds are still strongly against it.


Since 2006 when the Taliban were severely weakened, they have gained hugely in numbers, resources and efficiency. Since 2006 British control over Helmand province has been enormously reduced and Taliban influence greatly increased. Coalition forces currenly control just 30% of Afghanistan. Corruption remains rife, and the whole country is deteriorating into a narco-state. Whereas Afghanistan produced 4,600 tons of raw opium in 2003, by 2007 this had grown to 8,200 tons, no less than 93% of total world production. Furthermore coalition air strikes and raids against insurgents in the predominantly Pashtun south, involving a heavy civilian death toll, have further bolstered support for the resistance. Any idea that Afghan government forces are increasingly taking control over securityis fanciful. Karzai’s government remains dependent on the ISAF, and Northern warlords continue to occupy key cabinet positions.
So why is Britain now supplying another 500 troops? In his statement to the Commons on 14 October the Prime Minister repeatedly stressed that the aim was to train Afghan forces. Britain is setting up a new training centre that will train about 900 junior officers and NCOs each month, and apparently the new NATO training mission at Strasbourg expects to help train 40,000 Afghan soldiers next year. The question of course is whether increasing the British contingent by 500, equivalent to just 1% of the proposed American force increase of 40,000, will really bring about a turning point? Or whether this is simply the minimum number that the British Government could get away with, torn between the US demand for more British troops and the increasing unpopularity of this war with the British electorate?
The question then is:how much blood and treasure will the people of this country sacrifice when it has already taken 220 British lives (and 873 American lives in the last few months alone), and where the economic development of Afghanistan – which should be the first priority – is making such little headway and where deeply embedded corruption continues to derail all attempts at administrative reform? There is only a very small window left.

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