If, as is now admitted by the MOD, the deaths of all 14 crew on board the Nimrod XV230 over Helmand on 2 September 2006 were preventable, who is held to blame for this awful tragedy, and in what way? The 586 page report by the aviation lawyer Haddon-Cave, could hardly be more damning or more direct. The aircraft was doomed long before the crash by systematic and lamentable failings by senior MOD personnel, 10 of whom are specifically named in the report, as well as by BAE and Qinetiq (the privatised defence technology company) and the prevailing MOD culture of subordinating safety to cost-cutting. Moreover the coroner in May last year had already pronounced that “this aircraft, like every other aircraft in the Nimrod fleet, was not airworthy. What is more, the aircraft was in my judgement never airworthy from the first release to service in 1969 to the point where the Nimrod XV230 was lost”. Accountability has greatly weakened in Britain in recent years. So in this stark case of preventable tragedy, who should be held to account and how?

First, the 10 named, including 2 top MOD 4-star rank officers. General Cowan, tasked with bringing support agencies together for all the support services and in 2000 given a 20% target for reducing costs by 2005, should have realised (according to the official report) that thic ut could come at the expense of safety. His successor, Air Chief Marshal Pledger, failed to question the safety implications of this 20% savings goal. Group Captain Baber (since promoted) headed the MOD team reviewing the safety of RAF Nimrods and failed to document the potential dangers. Wing Commander Eagles managed the production of the 2001-5 safety review, but delegated the project wholesale to his safety manager Frank Walsh, who assessed the hazards in a ‘slapdash’ manner. All 5 should be sacked for gross and culpable irresponsibility, or if already retired, their pensions should be drastically cut.
Of the 3 BAE executives involved, Lowe was chiefly responsible for the poor planning and management of the safety review. Oldfield covered up large gaps in the analysis of possible risks, while Prince was all too ready to mislead customers about how completely the review work had been done. Of the 2 Qinetiq executives implicated, Mahy appoved the signing off of the BAE reports without reading them, and Blagrove failed in his duty to ensure that nothing was signed off by Qinetiq inappropriately. All 5 bear a heavy responsibility for the final tragedy, and should not only lose their jobs now for the way they caused 14 men to lose their lives, but should also be prohibited in future from being employed in any similar position of authority for which they have shown themselves unworthy.

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