Why the Invasion of Iraq Has Been a Success
Iraq has now become synonymous with catastrophe – a cauldron of destruction and carnage for the Iraqi people which is never-ending, the gravest foreign policy miscalculation of modern times, a defeat for America from which Iran has been the biggest gainer. But there is another view, and we would be foolish to ignore it.
The Iraq war, as even Alan Greenspan has now acknowledged, was "largely about oil". It happened not because Saddam Hussein had WMD (both UN and US inspectors were convinced he hadn't), not because Iraqis were involved in 9/11 (there was never any such evidence), and not because he was a brutal tyrant (that was actually seen as an asset in controlling a volatile region). His fatal error was rather that he refused to allow Western oil companies to exploit Iraqi oil reserves.
Iraq has known oil reserves of at least 112bn barrels, the third largest source after Saudi and Iran, and 5 times greater than US reserves. Iraq is the only country in the world that offers the prospect of a huge and rapid increase in oil production to meet surging global demand. The pre-war average production was 2.5 million barrels per day, but in the 1970s it had reached 6 million per day. But that under-states the potential. It is by far the least explored of all the world's oil-rich countries, with a mere 2,000 wells drilled (compared to a million just in Texas), and US official estimates put the total of undiscovered oil at some 200-300 billion barrels. That could now be worth $30 trillions, a sum 12 times larger than the entire GNP of the UK.
That prize, at a time when peak oil rapidly approaches, is nothing short of stupendous. The US military in Iraq may well be in physical control of a quarter of global oil reserves, with its troops located in the immediate vicinity of a further two-fifths of the world's oil supply in Saudi Arabia and Iran (where US interests may be focused much more on Iranian oil than on any Iranian nuclear threat).
The original Pentagon plan was for full-scale oil privatisation, as announced by the US proconsul, Paul Bremer. When combined with the disbanding of the Iraqi army and the sacking of thousands of Baathist administrators, it precipitated an armed rebellion. When the plan was also opposed by the former Chief Executive of Shell's American operations who was appointed by Washington to run the Iraqi oil industry, it was finally dropped. Attention shifted to Plan B. A draft Iraqi oil law was drawn up by the US with some UK involvement proposing that nearly all the oil would be ceded to Western companies. The Iraqi National Oil Company would keep less than a fifth of Iraq's current 80 oilfields, while the rest, including crucially all the oilfields not yet discovered, would go to the Western oil majors.
Unsurprisingly, this too met unrelenting opposition. The Bush Administration pretended that this was merely because of antagonism between Shias, Sunnis and Kurds over the oil share-out. But the real reason the law continues to be stalled is that it violates the underlying Iraqi nationalism shared between all three groups.
So how will the US keep control of its prize? The aim right from the start was to establish a permanent military platform in the Middle East, and at least five self-sufficient super-bases are already in the course of being completed across Iraq. As the neo-cons have since admitted, "We didn't have an exit strategy because we never intended to leave". Significantly, the US bases in Saudi established after the first Gulf War in 1991 (and which so angered Osama bin Laden in the lead-up to 9/11) were only run down once Iraq had been secured in April 2003 and an alternative military control centre became available. Since these five super-bases can each house some 10-20,000 troops, it certainly suggests that US forces in Iraq will perhaps halve below their current 'surge' levels of 160,000, but not very much more, for a long time ahead.
Will this continuing US military hegemony be sufficient to get the Western oil companies the control they crave for? One indication of current tactics is that as the negotiations over the oil law broke down in September, the Kurdistan Regional Government simply signed an oil production agreement with the Hunt Oil Company located in Dallas and run by one of President Bush's closest allies. The message was clear: the Iraqi Government may block the law, but in that case the oil companies will go ahead anyway. There is some evidence that this is already happening. Earlier this year Reuters revealed that B.P. has been operating in southern Iraq around the part-developed Rumaila oilfields which have a combined potential output capacity of half a million barrels a day.
Indeed the process is already moving to the next phase which is the sale of oil leases. The aim is for this to be done privately using American-appointed Iraqi agents. The argument is that Western oil companies already have valid leases for most Iraqi oilfields from decades in the past. They may have expired, but since they were illegally cancelled – it is contended – the new lawful Iraqi Government has no alternative but to accept an extension, even though they were unduly generous. The argument may go even further – that billions of barrels of oil have been illegally extracted from these fields over the past few decades by the Iraqi Government, and since these oil companies held valid production-sharing contracts, they are entitled to billions of dollars in compensation. If the Iraqi Government were to claim it lacks funding to pay, the oil companies would then withhold the Government's share of oil export revenues until reimbursement was made in full, which could take decades.
Against this scenario the condemnations hurled at the US occupation can be seen in a rather different light. The indifference to nation-building has virtually ensured that Iraq will remain a US protectorate for some considerable time to come – exactly as required for the extraction of its oil wealth. Dissolving the army and de-Baathification, so far from being a blunder, has pre-empted the threat that they would have created once it became apparent that the Americans would never leave. If the civil war gradually leads to Shias, Sunnis and Kurds retreating into separate enclaves, then a Balkanised Iraq and a weak federal government presided over by a Pentagon-size US embassy in Baghdad and five US military super-bases provide the best conditions for foreign exploitation of the country's oil.
In the eyes of Bush and Cheney, even if no-one else, this invasion has achieved almost all it set out to do.





